Who Decides? The Juror Rule Showdown in Ohio Courts

The right to a trial by jury in Ohio is one of the most fundamental rights in our judicial system. In civil cases, the Ohio Constitution requires concurrence of no less than three-fourths of the jury. Ohio Const., art. I §5. Where the civil law requires a verdict on sequential elements of a claim (i.e. a negligence claim requiring a showing of (1) a duty, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) proximate cause of damages by that breach), what jurors can weigh in on the sequential determinations about each of the elements where only three-fourths of their number find a duty? This issue, known as the “same-juror rule” or “any-juror rule,” was recently discussed by The Ohio Supreme Court in Hild v. Samaritan Health Partners, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-3338.

In Hild, six out of eight jurors agreed there was a breach of duty, but only five of those jurors agreed there was proximate cause. As a result, the trial court rejected the application of the “any-juror rule,” and judgment was for the defendant. An appeal to the Second District Court of Appeals, then to the Ohio Supreme Court followed.

The “same-juror rule” requires the same jurors to agree on all the elements comprising the verdict – meaning if the same three-fourths jurors do not agree on all the interconnected elements, then the verdict is invalid. Hild, ¶20 citing Fritz v. Wright, 589 PA. 219 (2006) and O’Connell v. Chesapeake & Ohio RR Co., 58 Ohio St.3d 226 (1991). In contrast, the “any-juror rule” allows any of the jurors to vote on any of the elements, regardless of their vote on other elements, which means their votes may not necessarily be consistent from issue to issue. Hild, ¶21 citing David A. Lombardero, Do Special Verdicts Improve the Structure of Jury Decision-Making?, 36 Jurimetrics J. 275 (1996).

Since 1991, the law in Ohio has been that the “same-juror rule” should be applied in comparative negligence actions. O’Connell v. Chesapeake, 58 Ohio St. 3d 226. The Court’s ruling in Hild this month broadens the application of the “same-juror rule” to all negligence claims. The Court found that it would be illogical to allow a juror who does not find a duty or a breach of that duty, to then vote on the issue of proximate cause. Hild, ¶ 23.

But the Hild opinion also provided some clarity on the question of constitutionality of the “same-juror rule.” If only a portion of the jurors are voting on the proximate cause, does that violate the fundamental right a party has to have the whole jury consider the case? The Court responded, no. The Hild majority found that its ruling does not preclude all of the jurors from discussing the sequential elements they are charged with deciding. Hild, ¶24. In other words, all the jurors may participate in the deliberation discussions, but only those who find a duty or a breach of that duty, may vote on the element of causation. Id.

J. Brunner, joined by J. Stewart, dissented with the Hild majority, stating the O’Connell “same-juror rule” applied to only the determination of apportionment of damages, thereby limiting it only to a specific element of the comparative negligence claims. Hild, ¶30. The dissenting justices agreed with the application of the rule in O’Connell, reasoning it would be inconsistent for a juror to find no negligence in response to one question, then apportion a percentage of negligence to another. Id. However, the dissenting justices in Hild disagreed with the majority opinion because extending the “same-juror rule” to the other elements of negligence claims would go against more than 30 years of Ohio precedent that allowed the full jury to deliberate on every other issue outside of apportionment. Hild, ¶33. The dissenting justices opined it is possible for a juror to find a party caused an injury but was not negligent, stating “[a]ccidents happen.” Hild, ¶34.

Although the Hild opinion may not be the last word on the application of the “same-juror rule” in Ohio civil claims, it is arguably binding authority for negligence claims in Ohio and should be considered when drafting jury instructions and interrogatories involving questions of duty, breach, then causation. Hild also may be considered persuasive authority for any other claim that involves interconnected elements on a jury form.